

troops on leave, including those that will take leave before we are able to complete our legislation, by adopting this amendment. In working on this amendment, I wanted to be sure we avoided creating an unfair disparity between soldiers. We will not likely conclude action on this supplemental until the tail end of October, and by that time several thousand soldiers will have already paid for their own travel home. It seemed unfair to me that these soldiers should be forced to pay their own way while those who traveled later would go at government expense.

Our troops in Iraq have been serving under difficult conditions, and they deserve our full support. I greatly appreciate Chairman STEVENS' willingness to include this important issue in the supplemental appropriations bill. I am happy that we were able to work together to provide for the travel expenses of our brave soldiers serving in Iraq.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The amendment (No. 1802) was agreed to.

Mr. LEAHY. I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. COLEMAN. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, what is the parliamentary situation?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from Vermont is recognized to offer an amendment.

Mr. LEAHY. I thank my friend, the distinguished Presiding Officer.

AMENDMENT NO. 1803

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Vermont [Mr. LEAHY] for himself, Mr. DASCHLE, and Mr. BIDEN, proposes an amendment numbered 1803.

(Purpose: To place the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq under the direct authority and foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State)

On page 25, line 21, before the colon, insert the following:

: *Provided further*, That beginning not later than 60 days after enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority shall report to and be under the direct authority and foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State.

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, this is a very simple amendment. That is why I didn't follow the usual procedure where amendments are simply deemed read. This was a short enough one that I wanted it read.

It does what many of us feel we should have done 5 months ago when we appropriated the first \$2.5 billion in foreign aid for Iraq. At the time we gave that very substantial amount of foreign aid to Iraq, many of us urged the Secretary of State—not the Sec-

retary of Defense—should have authority over the reconstruction program.

No matter who is Secretary of State, no matter who is Secretary of Defense, when you are going to give enormous amounts of foreign aid for reconstruction, the aid should be under the Department of State. After all, foreign aid is the responsibility of the State Department. Also, it is the responsibility of USAID. That is what they know how to do. That is what their people are trained to do.

It is not what the Pentagon does, nor, for that matter, is it what the Pentagon should be doing. The Pentagon is trained in military combat. In fact, our forces, the men and women in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, are the best trained, the best equipped, best motivated of any military in the world. Obviously, they showed they can easily defeat other military forces as they did in Iraq.

While they are trained for war, the State Department is trained to work to rebuild. In this case, as superb as the military role was, their leadership disregarded the preparatory work the State Department and USAID had done in planning for after the war. The problems they now face reflect that.

I am concerned we are putting our men and women in the military in an impossible situation. They are being asked not only to provide security, but to also oversee the reconstruction.

I have a lot of respect for Ambassador Bremer. I have known him and worked with him on terrorism and other matters over the years. He did a good job last week when he testified before the Appropriations Committee. Like a lawyer arguing the brief for his client, he argued well. But Ambassador Bremer's office, which is located in the Pentagon, until very recently was not capable of responding to our questions. The questions we were asking were not how many divisions might move here or how many tanks, airplanes, helicopters, men and women under arms can move, but, rather, how can we do a better job of getting water, and electricity, and other aid to the Iraqi people?

We saw the reconstruction plan, apparently a Pentagon plan, an 8-page document. When it came out a couple months ago, none of us on this side of aisle received it.

Now that we have seen it, I understand why they didn't want everyone to have it. It is embarrassingly illustrative of the administration's postwar strategy. There was no postwar strategy. All the strategy led up to winning in Iraq. Everyone knew how that would come out. Of course we would defeat the broken Iraqi army. Everyone knew we were going to win. This was not World War II. But, amazingly enough, there was no strategy for what happened after we won.

I am not among those who believe everything we have done in Iraq has been a failure. There has been progress. For one thing, I am glad Saddam Hussein is

not here. He was a murderous tyrant. Members of the administration now talk about the murderous conduct of Saddam Hussein when he used chemical weapons against the Kurds—something many Members were outraged about at the time—and they seem to forget the administration they served at that time turned a blind eye to that and continued to give aid to Saddam Hussein.

Having said that, now I think everyone, whether those in the Congress or the administration who supported Saddam Hussein over the years, we all agree—all Republicans, all Democrats agree—he was a tyrant and it is good he is gone. That is progress.

We have begun to train a new army and police force and so on. That is progress. But we were told this spring that the amount of money for the aid program would be very small. Now we are asked to increase our aid program ten fold, with virtually no controls on how the money will be spent.

So, we got into the war, we had no plan for what we would do afterwards, we have real problems now, and now they want a blank check to take care of it. We will pay \$33,000 each for pickup trucks that sell for \$14,000 here, and we will pay \$6,000 for telephones you can buy in the neighboring country of Jordan for \$500 or \$600. We will pay \$50,000 a bed for a prison although that is far more than we would in the United States. We will repair their power infrastructure although we do not have money to do the same in the United States. We will build a whole lot of new schoolhouses although we do not have the money to fix our dilapidated schools. We will build state-of-the-art hospitals even though we do not have the money for new health clinics in parts of the United States. And we are told: Just give us the money and trust us; we know what to do.

In my State, we do not sign blank checks. I am sure we will give money for foreign aid even though we do not have the money to do the same things in the United States.

Simply spending more money does not get us back on track. We need a real plan, and we need the right agency in charge. That is why this amendment is so short. It is one sentence. It simply puts the Coalition Provisional Authority—and I assume that will be Ambassador Bremer although I am not doing this on an ad hominem basis—simply put the coalition provisional authority, Ambassador Bremer, who has been working around the clock to carry out our interests there, under the foreign policy guidance and direction of the Secretary of State. It would provide 60 days after enactment to give the State Department time to put in place the people it needs.

Does that mean the Department of Defense no longer has any role in reconstruction? Of course not. They obviously will be consulted on a continuous basis. Everyone knows nothing can be